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Introduction 
Relations between the European Union and 
Belarus have seen little change since President 
Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 
1994. Belarus has languished in a state of self-
imposed political isolation despite the 
subsequent waves of enlargement – most 
notably, the 2004 enlargement which made 
Belarus a direct neighbour of the EU – and the 
formulation in 2004 of the European Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU’s dual-track 
approach of imposing sanctions and trade 
restrictions whilst promoting democratisation in 
Belarus have so far yielded minimal results.  
The EU renewed its offer in December 2006 “to the 
people of Belarus” of closer cooperation, in return 
for a series of democratisation measures, put 
forward in the form of an unofficial document. 
Today, however, there still exists no framework for 
political dialogue at the highest level between the 
EU and Belarus. The energy crisis between Belarus 
and Russia in December 2006-January 2007 created 
the impression that Belarus wished to move closer 
to the EU. However, one year later, Belarus appears 
to have mended its fences with Russia and has toned 
down its pro-EU rhetoric. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to analyse 
whether the dynamics of EU-Belarus relations have 
changed at all one year after the oil and gas crisis, 
and if so, whether the EU has succeeded in 
increasing its leverage over the country. A first 
section briefly reviews the EU’s policy towards 
Belarus since the coming to power of Lukashenko. 
Next, the paper looks into the oil and gas crisis and 
examines if Russia has radically changed its policy 
towards Belarus, by effectively ending the subsidies. 
Thirdly, we analyse Lukashenko’s efforts to offset 
the effects of the oil and gas crisis and the 
seriousness of his pro-European rhetoric. The fourth 
part attempts to verify whether there are any 
fundamental changes in the dynamics of EU-Belarus 
relations following the oil and gas crisis and 
speculates on how the EU can engage with the 
people of Belarus more effectively. Finally, the 
paper puts forward a series of short-term and longer-
term measures that the EU might consider, on the 
condition that Belarus commits to addressing the 
most basic requirements in the field of human rights 
and democratisation.  
1.  EU policy towards Belarus so far 
Relations between the EU and Belarus swiftly 
cooled down after Alexander Lukashenko swept to 
power in 1994. Relations further worsened after 
Lukashenko held a referendum in 1996, thereby 
changing the constitution to extend his presidential 
mandate until 2001. Throughout 1996-97, President 
Lukashenko increasingly adopted an authoritarian 
style of government. As a result, the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiated in 1995 
with the EU never entered into force, and neither did 
the Interim Trade Agreement. At the time, the EU 
grew concerned with the lack of separation of 
powers in Belarus, the absence of a dialogue 
between the authorities and the opposition, the 
worsening human rights conditions and the 
increasing restrictions on the freedom of the media 
and press. The EU refused to back Belarus’ 
candidacy for membership to the Council of Europe  
and until today, Belarus has not yet been accepted as 
a full member. 
At the time when the EU was formulating its 
neighbourhood policy in 2003-04,
1 which paved the 
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way for closer cooperation with the EU’s eastern 
and southern neighbours, Lukashenko yet again 
modified the constitution through a grotesquely 
flawed referendum in 2004, which ensured his 
possible re-election ad vitam. The lack of 
democratic reforms and the violation of the most 
basic human rights in Belarus meant that Belarus 
was  a priori excluded from the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This has left the EU without 
a well-defined political and economic framework 
for conducting its relations with Belarus. 
For well over a decade, the EU has consistently 
issued declarations and resolutions on Belarus, 
calling for urgent democratic reform, free elections, 
respect for fundamental human rights and freedom 
of the media and press. Trade, though steadily 
growing in recent years,
2 has remained below the its 
potential and EU financial assistance in the period 
1991-2005 has totalled a mere €221 million.
3 The 
EU has re-directed aid predominantly to projects 
promoting democratisation, projects with a social 
vocation or projects linked to the legacy of the 
Chernobyl disaster.  
The EU also took a number of negative measures 
and sanctions against Belarus, whilst trying to avoid 
direct harm to the population. These started with the 
decision to freeze the PCA and the Interim Trade 
Agreement in 1996 and to put an end to high-level 
political contacts with Belarus. The European 
Parliament also decided to withhold its assent on 
any bilateral agreement with Belarus. After the 
flawed presidential election in 2001 in Belarus, the 
EU slapped a visa ban on Belarus’ leadership. This 
ban has been renewed on a yearly basis until today 
and currently comprises 35 persons, including 
judges and prosecutors involved in the harsh 
sentencing of opposition activists. The subsequent 
flawed presidential election in 2006 provoked the 
EU to impose a freeze on the assets of the 
blacklisted people. In June 2007, the EU also 
withdrew Belarus’ trade preferences under the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), after the 
International Labour Organisation voiced concern 
over the curtailing of the rights of trade unions in 
the country. Belarus also faces one of the most 
restrictive trade regimes with the EU in the textiles 
sector. Other EU partners such as the US and 
                                                                               
enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf) and European Commission, 
Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy, 12 
May 2004 (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/ 
strategy_paper_en.pdf). 
2 According to Eurostat data, bilateral trade has been picking 
up since 2004, when the total trade volume stood at €5.2 
billion. In 2006, the total trade volume reached €8.7 billion.  
3 See the website of the EU TACIS Branch Office in Minsk 
(http://www.delblr.ec.europa.eu/page84.html).  
Canada have followed the EU in its visa ban and 
also frozen the assets of the Belarusian leadership. 
The EU renewed its calls for the democratisation of 
Belarus in December 2006, when the European 
Commission published a non-paper
4 addressed to 
the people of Belarus (in an obvious snub to the 
leaders of Belarus) in which it promises easier 
travel, increased trade and investment, cooperation 
in a number of sectoral policies (environment, 
transport and energy), cultural and educational 
exchanges, etc., in return for a series of 
democratisation measures to be carried out by the 
Belarus authorities (see Box 1). In this document, 
the EU explains to Belarus’ population that their 
country cannot be included in the ENP and benefit 
from closer ties with the EU if their government 
does not end its self-isolation by proceeding with 
democratic reforms. The EU also pledges continued 
support for the broadcasting of independent TV and 
radio programmes to Belarus and support for 
Belarusian students studying in the EU.  
The Commission’s non-paper has meant significant 
moral support for the Belarusian opposition, adding 
an element of external legitimacy to their stance 
against Lukashenko’s regime. Despite the fact that 
opposition activists have promoted the document in 
rallies and marches, so far the non-paper seems to 
have passed largely unnoticed by the wider 
Belarusian population. In addition, the Belarusian 
leadership did not attach any importance to it, as 
attested to by the local elections several weeks after 
the release of the EU’s non-paper, in January 2007, 
which fell short of democratic standards and where 
excessive repressive measures were taken against 
the opposition.  
For more than a decade, the EU’s dual-track 
approach of imposing sanctions and trade 
restrictions whilst focusing its aid efforts 
predominantly on democratisation has not been able 
to influence the political situation in Belarus: 
Lukashenko remains in power with high rates of 
popular approval. The EU’s leverage (political and 
economic) with regard to Belarus remains limited, 
in the absence of overwhelming popular support for 
the EU membership in Belarus (support hovers 
around 35%). Although the EU’s non-paper puts the 
ball in the court of the Belarusian leadership, 
Belarus has never shown any sign of interest in 
joining the EU or indeed even its neighbourhood 
policy. On top of lacking an official framework 
through which to engage Belarus, the EU’s task was 
further complicated by Russia’s overbearing 
                                                 
4 European Commission Non-Paper, “What the European 
Union could bring to Belarus”, 5 December 2006 
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/ 
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presence, whose exclusivist approach with regard to 
Belarus holds no room for a ménage à trois with the 
EU. However, Russia made some changes in its 
policy at the end of 2006.  
Box 1. Democratisation measures demanded by the EU 
•  Respect the right of the people of Belarus to elect 
their leaders democratically – their right to hear all 
views and see all election candidates; the right of 
opposition candidates and supporters to campaign 
without harassment, prosecution or imprisonment; 
independent observation of the elections, including 
by Belarusian nongovernmental organisations; their 
freedom to express their will and have their vote 
fairly counted. 
•  Respect the right  of the people of Belarus to 
independent information, and to express 
themselves freely e.g. by allowing journalists to 
work without harassment or prosecution, not shutting 
down newspapers or preventing their distribution. 
•  Respect the rights of non-governmental 
organisations as a vital part of a healthy democracy 
– by no longer hindering their legal existence, 
harassing and prosecuting members of NGOs, and 
allowing them to receive international assistance. 
•  Release all political prisoners – members of 
democratic opposition parties, members of NGOs 
and ordinary citizens arrested at peaceful 
demonstrations or meetings. 
•  Properly and independently investigate or review 
the cases of disappeared persons. 
•  Ensure the right  of the people of Belarus to an 
independent and impartial judicial system – with 
judges who are not subject to political pressure, and 
without arbitrary and unfounded criminal 
prosecution or politically-motivated judgements such 
as locking-up citizens who peacefully express their 
views. 
•  End arbitrary arrest and detention, and ill-treatment. 
•  Respect the rights and freedoms of those Belarusian 
citizens who belong to national minorities. 
•  Respect the rights  of the people of Belarus as 
workers – their right to join a trade union and the 
right of trade unions to work to defend the people’s 
rights. 
•  Respect the rights  of the people of Belarus as 
entrepreneurs  to operate without excessive 
intervention by the authorities. 
•  Join the other nations of Europe in abolishing the 
death penalty. 
•  Make use of the support which the OSCE, the EU 
and other organisations offer to Belarus to help it 
respect the rights of its people. 
Source: European Commission Non-Paper, “What the 
European Union could bring to Belarus”, 5 December 
2006. 
2.  Shifts in Russia’s policy towards 
Belarus 
For several years, Putin had been calling for an end 
to Russian subsidies to the Belarusian economy, 
granted mainly in the form of gas and oil deliveries 
at preferential price rates.
5 Eventually, the 
Belarusian authorities gave in to Russian/Gazprom 
pressure and agreed on 31 December 2006 to a last-
minute protocol (signed on 18 May 2007) on the 
supply of oil and gas. The agreement stipulates the 
acquisition by Gazprom of 50% of Beltransgaz – the 
national Belarusian pipeline network which supplies 
Europe and domestic consumers – for $2.5 billion. It 
also set down a gradual increase of the gas price 
paid by Belarus to Gazprom over the coming years, 
reaching the ‘European price’ by 2011. As of 
January 2007, the gas price jumped from $46.68 to 
$100 per 1000 cubic meters,
6 which nonetheless 
remains very low compared to the average price on 
the European market of $250. In the first quarter of 
2008, the gas price jumped to $119 per 1000 cubic 
meters
7, and is expected to rise to $150 in the latter 
part of 2008.
8 In addition, Russian oil companies 
need to pay a customs fee of $53 per tonne for 
exporting crude oil to Belarus, whereas previously 
this was duty-free. Finally, Belarus needs to transfer 
70% of the tax revenues from refined oil products to 
Russia.  
Furthermore, Russia scrapped plans to build a 
Yamal-Europe II pipeline, connecting Russia to 
Europe, through Belarus, despite Lukashenko’s 
offer of a five-year transit fee waiver if Russia 
abandoned the idea of the trans-Baltic Nord Stream 
pipeline.
9 Finally, Gazprom, which supplies 
annually 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas to 
Belarus, threatened once again in August 2007 to 
cut gas supplies to Belarus by 45% due to an unpaid 
                                                 
5 Belarus News and Analysis, “Putin orders end to subsidies 
for Belarus”, 5 December 2006 (http://www.data.minsk.by/ 
belarusnews/052006/23.html).  
6 Yakov Minkov, “Can the stronghold withstand an 
economic attack? The challenges and prospects of the 
Belarusian Economy in the Near Future”, Research Paper 
8/2007, Office for a Democratic Belarus and Association for 
International Affairs, Prague, 2007, p. 22. 
7 Belarus News and Analysis, “Belarus to buy Russian gas at 
$119 per 1000 cu m in 1Q08”, 1 January 2008 
(http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/012008/1.html).  
8 Interfax, “Russian gas could cost from USD 120 to USD 
150 per 1000 cubic meters for Belarus in ’08”, 1 November 
2007 (http://www.interfax.com/5/330853/ 
news.aspx).  
9 Radio Free Europe, “Russian Ambassador dismisses need 
for second line of pipeline via Belarus”, 2 November 2007 
(http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/11/3-cee/ 
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gas bill of $456 million for gas deliveries in the first 
half of 2007. 
The impasse in Belarus-Russian relations went 
much deeper than the energy dispute, and must also 
be sought in the fundamentally opposed visions held 
by Lukashenko and Putin about the Russia-Belarus 
state union. Putin has openly favoured an integration 
process by the absorption of Belarus into a union 
that Russia would dominate, essentially turning 
Belarus into a Russian province, whilst Lukashenko 
envisages nothing more than a loose confederation.  
Russia’s earlier gas and oil subsidies allowed the 
Belarusian economy to thrive and to show growth 
rates averaging 10% in the three years 2004-06,
10 
thereby bolstering domestic support for 
Lukashenko. Estimates show that preferential prices 
for gas and the absence of export duties towards 
Russia on refined oil products represented about $6 
billion in additional revenues for Belarus, or about 
13.5% of the country’s annual GDP.
11  
Under the new conditions dictated by Moscow, 
however, Lukashenko’s ‘economic miracle’ may 
become more difficult to sustain. Calculations 
indicate that in 2007, the deficit in the balance of 
payments caused by the gas and oil shock will be 
equal to $1.6 billion.
12 Belarus may in the short run 
continue to rely on adjustment loans granted 
(increasingly be grudgingly) by the Russian 
Federation to cover its budget deficit, but it may 
become more inclined to consider certain economic 
reforms, a diversification of its energy supplies and 
the attraction of foreign capital and trade partners 
from the EU. On a recent visit to Slovakia, Valery 
Voronetsky, Deputy Foreign Affairs Ministers, was 
reported to have said that the Belarusian 
government attaches close attention to the 
development of a favourable investment climate 
through liberalisation and economic cooperation.
13 
If Belarus has thus far been able to ignore the EU’s 
admittedly weak trade pressures, sanctions and 
declarations about human rights violations and the 
                                                 
10 According to the IMF and Belarus official statistics, the 
growth rates were 11.4% in 2004, 9.3% in 2005 and 10% in 
2006. 
11 Yakov Minkov, op. cit., pp. 22-23. The figures are for 
2006 only. 
12 Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, “Bleeding 
Belarus: Economic outlook after the energy conflict with 
Russia”, 10 January 2007 (http://www.belinstitute.eu/ 
images/stories/documents/bleeding%20belarus_economic%
20outlook.pdf).  
13 The National Centre of Legal Information of the Republic 
of Belarus, “Belarus, Slovakia need to intensify 
cooperation”, Valery Voronetsky says, 13 December 2007 
(http://law.by/work/EnglPortal.nsf/NewsBelForInt/83F7208
7844DD7F6C22573B000514451?OpenDocument).  
need for democratisation, its worsening relations 
with Russia at the end of 2006 and for the better part 
of 2007 certainly created the impression that 
Belarus may look now to improve its relations with 
the EU. The row with Russia over gas and oil prices 
in December 2006-January 2007 prompted 
Lukashenko to tone down his anti-European 
rhetoric. From its side, the EU seemed more 
inclined than ever to start a dialogue on energy with 
Belarus as Brussels became increasingly wary of a 
possible disruption of Russian energy supplies 
transiting through Belarus to Europe.  
3.  Lukashenko’s ‘new foreign policy’ 
It was not unusual before the gas and oil crisis to 
hear in Minsk that, strategically, the EU cannot offer 
Belarus what its Eastern vector can offer in terms of 
oil and gas prices, markets, loans, etc. Since January 
2007, the discourse has become a little more 
nuanced. It is still too early to clearly evaluate the 
scale of the social and economic impact of Russia’s 
new policy towards Belarus, but the country started 
taking measures early on to offset the effects of the 
energy crisis as much as possible. Belarus 
introduced the concept of a ‘new foreign policy’ as a 
way to mark its independence from Russia, which 
was essentially based on two dimensions: 
diversifying its foreign energy supplies by fostering 
closer ties with energy-rich countries and adopting a 
clear pro-EU discourse in official declarations 
asking for closer cooperation with the EU in several 
mutually beneficial fields, namely energy. 
Belarus is intent on decreasing its energy 
dependence on Russia. Its high-level contacts 
throughout 2007 with Venezuela, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Nigeria but also Norway (all major oil or gas 
producers) can be seen as an attempted rebuff to 
Russia’s high-handed energy policies and as a wish 
to reduce Belarus’ total dependency on Russian 
energy imports. As part of its energy diversification 
efforts, Belarus is also looking into the possibility of 
building a nuclear power plant, despite the fact that 
a large part of its population is still suffering from 
the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. 
As regards trade, the Belarusian economy has been 
traditionally geared towards producing 
manufactured goods for the former Soviet market. 
Russia is the second largest trading partner of 
Belarus, after Germany, with bilateral trade reaching 
$18 billion. Belarusian products are not as 
competitive on the EU market as they are on 
Russia’s and other CIS markets. The customs union 
between Russia and Belarus further precludes a free 
trade agreement with the EU, but the EU-27 
surpasses Russia as the leading destination for 
Belarusian exports (in 2006 45.6 % for the EU The EU’s Limited Response to Belarus’ Pseudo ‘New Foreign Policy’ | 5 
against 34.7% for Russia).
14 Despite the EU’s trade 
sanctions and the removal of Belarus from the GSP 
(generalised system of preferences), which 
represents a loss of roughly €400 million per year 
for Belarus,
15 trade between Belarus and the EU is 
growing steadily.
16 
As part of its declared ‘new foreign policy’, the 
Belarusian leadership has also been making 
overtures to the EU. In January 2007, Lukashenko 
extravagantly claimed that he would rather adopt the 
euro and seek EU membership than adopt the 
Russian ruble and join a union with Russia under 
the terms dictated by the Kremlin. More seriously, 
he expressed his wish to see the EU open up its 
internal market for Belarusian products. Advocating 
an open and honest dialogue with the West, he 
considered that the present moment was favourable 
for mending ties
17 and has proposed to start 
cooperating with the EU in mutually beneficial 
areas, such as energy, transport, illegal migration, 
etc. Belarusian officials have also announced plans 
to liberalise Belarus’ visa regime for EU citizens 
and express hope that bilateral relations may 
advance from a simple free trade relationship to 
more advanced forms of economic cooperation.
18 
In addition, Belarus is keen to receive investments 
from the EU. Many state-run companies and assets 
may be privatised in the near future, state assets 
being estimated at $132 billion.
19 Attracting foreign, 
in particular EU investment, thereby, also serves as 
a safeguard towards future aggressive tactics from 
Russia. Lukashenko himself claimed in the 
aftermath of the energy crisis with Russia that “if 
Western energy companies had had stakes in the 
Belarusian energy transport networks, Russia would 
never have acted so brutally” adding that “eyes in 
                                                 
14 European Commission, EU-Belarus trade in 2006 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ 
tradoc_113351.pdf). 
15 Charter 97, “EU decides to impose mini-trade sanctions on 
Belarus”, 21 December 2006 (http://www.charter97.org/ 
eng/news/2006/12/21/rada).  
16 Trade in 2006 stood at €8.7 billion, growing by almost 
25% compared to 2005. See (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113351.pdf).  
17 Belarus News and Analysis, “Lukashenko sets out rare 
pitch to Western investors”, 26 January 2007 
(http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/012007/607.html).  
18 Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Belarus Mr. Valery Voronetsky at the EU Conference 
“Working Together – Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 3 September 2007 
(http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/press/official-releases/ 
fa1aad88b52f8cdf.html).  
19 Charter 97, “Abramovich plans to buy Belarusian oil and 
chemistry industry”, 5 October 2007 (http://www.charter97. 
org/index.php?c=ar&i=412&c2=&i2=0&p=1&lngu=en).  
Russia are sparkling when speaking of future 
privatisation of Belarusian industry”.
20  
However, Lukashenko’s ‘new foreign policy’ failed 
to seduce the EU and it did not result in any 
democratisation at home. Instead, the pro-European 
rhetoric is perceived as being used as an irritant 
towards Moscow. The fears of an economic and 
social backlash following harsher terms of trade for 
energy imports from Russia have not materialised 
and Lukashenko’s grip on power has not 
diminished. He is still widely popular and can count 
on rates of support between 50 and 60%, while the 
anti-Lukashenko electorate represents slightly over 
30% of the population.
21  
The Russia-factor remains the key to Belarusian 
foreign policy one way or the other. Despite the 
economic costs resulting from the increased prices 
for Russian energy, relations with Russia seem 
actually to be on the mend, as attested to by a two-
day visit by Putin to Minsk in mid-December 
2007.
22 During that visit Lukashenko wished to 
show a relatively united Russia-Belarus front to the 
outside world and underlined that “Belarus and 
Russia are making an immense contribution to the 
European continent's economic and socio-political 
stability” and that “reciprocal steps are expected 
from the EU” in this regard.
23  
However, speculation about speeding up the 
establishment of a Russia-Belarus union may not 
materialise very soon. Currently, the bruised 
bilateral relations need a lot of patching-up. Belarus 
will continue to pay higher prices for gas and oil 
(this was reconfirmed during the meeting). In return 
the Belarusian government is raising the transit 
tariff of Russian oil headed westward through the 
Druzhba pipeline by 16% on 1 February 2008, 
presenting an additional income to the state budget 
of $31 million.
24 This goes against the logic of 
building a so-called ‘state-union’ in which oil and 
                                                 
20 Interview with Alexander Lukashenko, by Alexander Rahr 
in  Die Welt, 25 January 2007 (http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article711195/Die_Opposition_ist_in_Weissrussland_k
eineswegs_verboten.html).  
21 Results are taken from an IISEPS opinion poll of May 
2007, “Trends of change in Belarusian public opinion about 
some social-economic and political problems” 
(http://www.iiseps.org/etrends.html). 
22 Official website of the President of Belarus, “Alexander 
Lukashenko meets with President of the Russian Federation 
Vladimir Putin”, 13 December 2007 
(http://www.president.gov.by/en/press48860.html#doc).  
23 Interfax, “Minsk expects reciprocal steps from Europe in 
response to stable energy supply”, 14 December 2007 
(http://www.interfax.com/5/346855/news.aspx). 
24 Belarus News and Analysis, “Belarus to raise oil transit 
tariff 16% on Feb 1”, 9 January 2008 
(http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/012008/34.html).  6 | George Dura 
gas would be as cheap in Belarus as in Russia. 
Lukashenko’s trust in Putin seems to have been 
shaken by the energy crisis, and he has in any case a 
record of stalling and restarting the process of 
building a state-union with Russia. Since 1996 no 
consensus has been found as to the final shape of the 
state-union, despite the existence of a draft 
constitution since 2006. 
Nothing in the latest visit of Putin to Minsk, where 
the issue of the state-union was put again on the 
table after the energy crisis, indicates that 
Lukashenko will act differently this time. 
Lukashenko received a $1.5 billion loan, which 
looks almost tailored to cover the $1.6 billion in 
losses incurred to the Belarusian budget in 2007 
following the energy crisis. In return, Russia 
received assurances of Lukashenko’s willingness to 
host Russian tactical nuclear weapons on his 
country’s territory in a response to the deployment 
of a US missile defence shield in Eastern Europe. 
Despite the impressions created during Putin’s visit, 
there appears to have been no major breakthrough 
on the state-union. Instead, relations with Russia 
almost seem to have gone back to ‘business as 
usual’. 
4.  EU engagement in Belarus after the 
energy crisis 
Over the past four years, EU foreign policy towards 
its neighbours has evolved substantially, through the 
formulation of the ENP and through the EU’s 
enlargement to Belarus’ neighbours in Central and 
Eastern Europe. This has created new opportunities 
for EU-Belarus relations. Has the Russo-Belarus 
energy crisis altered the dynamics of EU-Belarus 
relations? Presently, the EU prefers to stick to its 
previous point that the EU will open up the ENP 
offer to Belarus if Minsk will start implementing the 
Commission’s non-paper of December 2006, with 
its list of democratisation measures.
25 However, 
some member states seem willing to engage even 
further with Belarus. In addition, the European 
Commission has shown signs that it might consider 
certain forms of dialogue at a more technical level.  
As things stand at present, Belarus is not interested 
in the ENP offer, because the price to be paid by the 
political elite for strengthening ties with the EU is 
too high. In terms of aid, the ENP might in the best 
of circumstances offer something between what 
Moldova and Ukraine are now set to receive: 
Moldova will receive over €210 million in the 
period 2007-10,
26 whereas Ukraine will receive 
                                                 
25 European Commission Non-Paper, op. cit. 
26 BBC Romanian News, “Voronin-Barroso meeting in 
Brussels”, 14 January 2008 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
€647 million for the same period.
27 In addition to 
direct financial aid, Belarus could also benefit from 
loans from the European Investment Bank and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. The increased bilateral trade through 
access to the EU’s market would also be beneficial 
for the Belarusian economy. However, the economic 
benefits of increased cooperation with the EU are 
dwarfed by the subsidies and economic cooperation 
with Russia, even in the post-‘oil and gas crisis’ 
setting. In addition, Lukashenko would have to 
democratise Belarusian politics and society, thereby 
seriously jeopardising his future as Belarus’ 
president. He would also have to open up the state-
run economy which has been providing so 
generously for his power base, supporters and 
closest allies for over a decade.  
Instead, Belarus has expressed an interest in 
developing pragmatic relations with the EU centred 
on cooperation in certain mutually beneficial areas 
and based on non-interference in its domestic 
affairs. In September 2007, the deputy minister of 
foreign affairs of Belarus, Valery Voronetsky, 
renewed calls for cooperation at the EU’s 
conference on “Working Together – Strengthening 
the European Neighbourhood Policy” by stating that 
“we [Belarus] offer to carry out serious joint 
European projects to secure the protection of transit, 
including the physical security of oil and gas 
pipelines”.
28 
Indeed, Belarus’ role as a crucial transit country for 
Russian oil and gas cannot easily be overlooked in 
Brussels, especially in view of the EU’s growing 
dependence on Russian energy.
29 A total of 46.7 
billion cubic meters of Russian gas will have 
transited to the EU via Belarus in 2007, 15.7 billion 
of which will have passed through the Beltransgaz 
pipeline and the rest (around 30 billion cubic 
meters) through the Russian-owned Belarusian 
                                                                               
romanian/moldova/story/2008/01/080114_voronin_bruxelles
.shtml).  
27 Radio Free Europe, “EU announces €647 million in aid 
for Ukraine”, 7 March 2007 (http://www.rferl.org/ 
featuresarticle/2007/03/f6a07297-f45f-4bd0-96a8-
41998d151d42.html).  
28 Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Belarus Mr. Valery Voronetsky at the EU Conference 
“Working Together – Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels, 3 September 2007.  
29 See Eurostat press release, “Russia third trade partner of 
the EU27”, 25 October 2007 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa. 
eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_
CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2007/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR
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stretch of the Yamal-Europe pipeline.
30 Around 20% 
of the EU’s gas imports from Russia transit through 
Belarus, having as their main destination Poland, 
Germany and Lithuania.
31 Gazprom’s take-over of 
50% of Beltransgaz, under strong Russian pressure, 
is viewed warily in the EU. The move comes in the 
midst of European Union efforts to formulate a 
coherent external energy policy.
32 On 19 September 
2007, the Commission also tabled a proposal for a 
third energy liberalisation package which “proposes 
a requirement that third country individuals and 
countries cannot acquire control over a Community 
transmission system […] unless this is permitted by 
an agreement between the EU and the third 
country.”
33 
Not surprisingly, therefore, energy is one of the 
areas where the EU and Belarus face fairly similar 
concerns and have decided to take certain 
preliminary steps towards cooperation. A bilateral 
delegation of experts on energy met last June, but a 
follow-up meeting was delayed indefinitely by the 
EU after the series of arrests of opposition youth 
activists in August. Nonetheless, in the field of 
energy, the EU is expecting to launch a serious 
energy cooperation dialogue with Belarus and set up 
an early warning mechanism.
34 
Without being able to engage official Belarus within 
the framework of the ENP, the EU has to explore 
other foreign policy tools. The EU is intent on 
continuing and reinforcing its policy towards the 
Belarusian grass-roots and society at large. Despite 
all the anti-European propaganda in the Belarusian 
state-controlled media, opinion polls show that more 
than 50% of Belarusians support closer cooperation 
with the EU
35 and that 36% would vote in favour of 
                                                 
30 Vladimir Socor, “Gazprom taking over the pipelines in 
Belarus”,  Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown 
Foundation, 21 May 2007 (http://www.jamestown.org/edm/ 
article.php?article_id=2372177). 
31 European Commission, “The Gas Coordination Group 
evaluates the recent Russian-Belarus gas dispute”, 4 January 
2007, press release IP/07/3. 
32 See for instance the Conclusions of the European Council 
of 8-9 March 2007, and the European Council’s Action Plan 
(2007-2009) for an Energy Policy for Europe 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pre
ssData/en/ec/93135.pdf). 
33 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, p. 7, 19 September 2007 
(http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/doc/ 
2005_1775_regulation_amending_en.pdf). 
34 Andris Piebalgs, EU Energy Commissioner, “EU’s 
response to the global energy challenges”, speech at the 
Vilnius Energy Security Conference, 11 October 2007. 
35 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Vitali Silitski and Lubos Vesely, 
“Effective Policy towards Belarus – A Challenge for the 
their country’s accession to the EU in a 
referendum.
36 These levels of domestic support for 
the EU are clearly more than sufficient therefore to 
justify greater EU involvement in Belarus.  
In the area of democratisation and support for a free 
and democratic civil society, the EU encounters 
legal difficulties to provide financial support to civil 
society organisations, due to the fact that many 
NGOs are not allowed to legally register or are 
closed down after they register. The EU’s support 
for opposition movements also remains declaratory 
and symbolic. The EU will continue to focus its 
efforts on providing grants to NGOs for mainly 
apolitical and socially-oriented projects. In addition 
the EU will continue to provide scholarships for 
students. The EU, for instance, also offers generous 
financial assistance to the Belarusian European 
Humanistic University in exile just across the 
border, in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius. However, the 
EU’s impact remains limited, as long as the 
Belarusian authorities continue to harass NGOs and 
are responsible for individually approving the EU 
student scholarships.  
In the field of support to the independent media, the 
EU seems to have a freer hand. At present, the 
European Commission is supporting through a €2 
million project the production of independent TV 
and radio programmes that are aired in Belarus, by 
the international satellite TV station RTVI and by 
the “European Radio for Belarus” radio station 
broadcasting from Poland.
37 The Commission’s aim 
is to provide objective information about the EU and 
its policies and about world affairs and Belarusian 
politics. It also intends to launch a project in the 
coming months that would see the development of 
electronic content covering the European Union and 
events in Belarus. Belarus will also benefit from an 
overall EU media-support project addressed to all 
ENP partners.
38 However, the impact of the EU’s 
media campaign remains limited. A recent poll has 
shown that only a small fraction of the Belarusian 
population has watched the RTVI (6.9%) or listened 
to radio stations broadcasting from EU countries.
39 
                                                                               
enlarged EU”, European Choice for Belarus series, Stefan 
Batory Foundation, Warsaw, April 2005, p. 2. 
36 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS) National poll: “Trends of change in 
Belarusian public opinion about some social-economic and 
political problems” (http://www.iiseps.org/etrend.html), 
numbers are for May 2007. 
37 Media Consulta press release (http://www.media-
consulta.com/505.htm). 
38 Belarus News and Analysis, “EU To Launch Two Projects 
For Independent Media In Belarus”, 20 September 2007 
(http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/092007/157.html). 
39 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS) National poll: “Trends of change in 8 | George Dura 
Furthermore, almost two-thirds (58.3%) of 
Belarusians do not have access to the internet.
40 
Finally, the EU has been unable to provide 
substantial support to the independent press in 
Belarus. There exist fewer and fewer independent 
newspapers, which in any case do not have assured 
access to the state-run distribution service. In 
addition, journalists who refuse self-censorship are 
too often prosecuted for libel against political 
figures. 
EU policy towards Belarus has become more 
contested in debate between the member states since 
the 2004 enlargement, with neighbouring new 
member states advocating the opening of a political 
dialogue and the strengthening of trade relations. 
Despite the publication of its non-paper reflecting a 
principled, non-compromising approach, the 
Commission has also invited second-tier Belarusian 
officials (i.e. the deputy minister of foreign affairs) 
to Brussels and has also organised talks on energy 
cooperation, after the energy crisis. In addition, now 
that Belarusian neighbours such as Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia have joined the EU and 
articulate their interests with regard to Belarus at EU 
level, there appears to be a certain lack of 
coordination. For instance, the EU initially failed to 
find an agreement in December 2006 on the removal 
of Belarus from the GSP due to Polish and 
Lithuanian opposition for fears that this would hurt 
their respective economies. A consensus was finally 
reached six months later, in June 2007. 
There is also the question how the EU’s policy 
towards Belarus is perceived by Eastern ENP states. 
ENP states tend to perceive their relations with the 
EU as purely bilateral and do not place it in the 
wider regional context covered by the ENP. As a 
result, ENP states do not always support the EU’s 
policies towards Belarus. For understandable 
cultural and historical ties and above all trade 
relations, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia do not 
always align with EU CFSP statements on Belarus, 
they have not aligned on the visa ban imposed by 
the EU, and certainly do not intend to introduce 
trade sanctions.  
If EU-Ukraine relations turn into an ENP ‘success 
story’, this might have some influence on 
Lukashenko. Most visibly during the summer of 
2007, Ukraine and the EU reached an agreement on 
easing  Schengen visa restrictions for Ukrainians, 
which entered into force in January 2008. At the 
                                                                               
Belarusian public opinion about some social-economic and 
political problems” (http://www.iiseps.org/etrend.html). 
40 Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS) National poll: “Trends of change in 
Belarusian public opinion about some social-economic and 
political problems” (http://www.iiseps.org/etrend.html). 
same time, however, Belarusians are faced with the 
rising cost of Schengen visas (up to €60). This is all 
the more problematic for the people of Belarus, 
given their border with three new EU member 
states, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, all of which 
became part of the Schengen area on 21 December 
2007. Similarly, the EU and Ukraine are preparing 
to negotiate a deep free trade agreement, which 
would substantially open up bilateral market 
access,
41 whereas Belarus is facing trade sanctions.  
5.  Conclusion and recommendations 
The EU retains little effective leverage on the 
Belarusian regime. Its engagement in the field of 
democratisation has to date remained rather modest, 
since there is little that the EU can do without the 
cooperation of the Belarusian authorities. However, 
the Belarusian authorities are willing to start 
cooperating on several sectoral issues with the EU. 
In addition, Minsk does not seem to oppose 
establishing some kind of a political dialogue with 
the EU, as it may also produce the side-effect of 
temporarily silencing the opposition. The EU has 
also made efforts in 2007 to define a strategy on 
Central Asia,
42 with countries sharing political 
similarities with Belarus.
43 The EU could, therefore, 
consider a number of additional measures with 
regard to Belarus, such as: 
•  Propose the opening of a dialogue on human 
rights (notably on the imposition of a 
moratorium on the death penalty, which is used 
less frequently in recent years, the release of 
political prisoners, and a halt to the continuous 
harassment of NGOs and political activists). 
•  Propose the opening of a dialogue on the 
disbursement of EU aid to Belarusian civil 
society organisations and students (in order to 
remove obstacles that prevent EU assistance 
from effectively reaching NGOs and students). 
•  Offere direct assistance – as opposed to only 
financing broadcasts from abroad – to the free 
press and media within Belarus for coverage of 
EU affairs, through language courses, training 
                                                 
41 Roman Olearchyk, “EU offers Ukraine closer ties to 
Brussels”,  Financial Times, 14 October 2007 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/41ec5b92-62c6-11dc-b3ad-
0000779fd2ac.html).  
42 EU Council, “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a 
new partnership”, 31 May 2007 
(http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st10/st10113.e
n07.pdf).  
43 EU External Relations Council Conclusions on 
Uzbekistan, 15 October 2007 
(http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st13/st13568-
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programmes and visits in Brussels. Such direct 
support could consist of financing a number of 
Belarusian ‘EU correspondents’ in Brussels, 
who can report back on the EU in their local 
newspapers. 
•  Reduce the EU visa fee from €60 to €35 for 
various categories of people (without going so 
far as to offer visa-facilitated travel), such as 
students, academics, businessmen, human rights 
activists, civil society representatives, 
journalists, etc. 
•  Continue the technical consultations on energy 
cooperation and stating the EU’s readiness to 
invest in Belarusian energy infrastructure. 
Other measures that could be considered in a longer-
term perspective, provided that the above measures 
are being implemented with some degree of success, 
are: 
•  Unilaterally draw up an EU-Belarus Action 
Plan, which would complement the European 
Commission non-paper of December 2006 and 
make the ENP offer more concrete. 
•  Include Belarus in relevant regional cooperation 
initiatives such as the Northern Dimension 
(where Belarus is encouraged to participate in 
expert level cooperation).
44 Also perhaps the 
Black Sea Synergy, which will encompass the 
eastern dimension of the ENP, and will 
complement sectoral EU programmes in areas 
like migration, border management, fighting 
organised crime, security, energy, transport and 
environment, so as to prepare for an eventual 
inclusion of Belarus into the ENP.  
  Pledge support for the inclusion of Belarus as a 
member with full rights in the Council of 
Europe, provided the human rights issues are 
addressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Finnish Presidency of the EU, “Northern Dimension 
Policy Framework Document”, adopted at the Helsinki 
Summit on 24 November 2006, p. 2 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
external_relations/north_dim/doc/frame_pol_1106.pdf).  
  Pledge support for the integration of Belarus 
into the WTO. 
Additionally, the Belarusian authorities could start 
taking a small number of symbolic steps with a low 
political price from the list of EU democratisation 
measures, such as: 
•  Release all political prisoners.
45 This would be a 
highly symbolic gesture for the EU and the 
Belarusian opposition, which would not seem so 
politically risky for Lukashenko, whose 
popularity remains high. 
•  Apply a moratorium on the death penalty. 
•  Refrain from obstructing the registration process 
and the effective campaigning by opposition 
candidates in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections in 2008. 
•  Allow the registration of Belarusian NGOs, 
which would provide the authorities with more 
transparency regarding the activities of civil 
society organisations and would allow NGOs to 
freely and openly carry out their activities. 
•  Improve the conditions of the labour unions so 
as to work towards removing the EU’s trade 
sanctions (the Belarusian government has been 
considering steps in this direction). 
The January 2007 energy crisis between Russia and 
Belarus may have made the Lukashenko regime 
more wary of Russia and perhaps more inclined to 
reason with the EU. Energy security preoccupies 
both Belarus and the EU. If technical cooperation in 
this field were successful, it could become a 
stepping stone towards cooperation in other 
sectors.
46 The basic limitation for EU-Belarus 
relations is that, strategically, Belarus has not so far 
set itself the ambition of joining the EU, unlike 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. 
                                                 
45 The Belarusian authorities have released a small 
number of political prisoners in early 2008, under 
pressure from the West. Certain high-level political 
prisoners (such as Alexander Kozulin, former presidential 
candidate, Andrei Klimau, former deputy and Alexander 
Zdzvishku, a journalist) remain in jail. 
46 In fact, the European Commission has just announced 
(28 January 2008) that further technical meetings will 
take place on energy, transport and the environment 
following the release by Belarus of three political 
prisoners.  10 | George Dura 
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